By Fr. James Fannan, PIME
The End of Medieval Philosophy
At this point it would be good to examine the rejection of Aristotle and those philosophers, like St, Thomas Aquinas, who based their thought on his tradition. We have already seen how Aristotle was basically unknown in the West, except for his logic book, till the time of the Crusades. It was the Muslim philosophers who revered Aristotle and gave him the title "the Philosopher." At this time, philosophy was still considered to be the supreme form of organized "science" which was seen as embracing all forms of human knowledge. Experimental science began to become more widespread around the time of Galileo (d. 1642). It was then that the scientific errors found in Aristotle would lead to a great decline in the esteem that he enjoyed in the West. For example, the astronomer Tycho Brahe was amazed in 1572 when he observed a supernova in the night sky. He was amazed because at the time the theory of Aristotle taught that the stars were perfect and unchanging. It was things like this that lessened the prestige of Aristotle.
The mention of Galileo in this context is not a coincidence. Many know about the controversy that Galileo had with the Catholic Church. What is almost always forgotten is that the consensus of the scientific community, based on Aristotle and also on the other great thinkers of Islam and ancient Greece, was that the earth was the center of the universe. Neo-Platonic elements in Islam had even incorporated this geocentric (earth-centered) view into philosophy. Thus Galileo was a true revolutionary when he said that the earth goes around the sun. In fact, it would be long after his lifetime that his theories could be scientifically proven with more refined methods of observation.
Thus it was at first especially among philosophers and astronomers that Galileo’s ideas were first opposed. The Church was brought into the matter because the Biblical writings were expressed in the concepts of ancient times, which is the only way people of that time could talk about them. The technical jargon of the "Big Bang" theory of today would not even be understood by ordinary people today, and no doubt new words and theories will appear in the future. Thus today, in many languages, even scientists and everyone else speak in terms of sunrise and sunset. It is absurd to think that the Bible could put aside the question of the origin of the universe permanently until science and language were available for a more literal account. In fact, that was not necessary to convey the theological truths anyway.
Thus, the controversy raised by Galileo certainly ran against the world view of Biblical times and even the world view of the scientific and philosophical community of his own times. Actually the clerics in charge of judging this case must have realized the matter was not so clear. This probably explains the odd fact that when he was condemned to house arrest by the Church authorities, the charge was that he was "suspected" of heresy, not that he had been proven guilty. Another odd thing about the event was that even though the Pope had been presented with the condemnation on at least three different occasions, he never actually signed it. Of course, the Pope had originally given Galileo permission to propose his new theory as long as Galileo maintained it was only a theory and not a proven fact as yet. But that was not satisfactory for Galileo and he heaped scorn on his opponents in the famous book. In the context of faith and reason, however, the Galileo case is normally remembered in the simplistic way we have all heard of it elsewhere, and it represents a special case that is mentioned again and again in the claim that the Catholic Church is an enemy of reason. To say such a thing is not true today nor was it really true even then when one looks carefully at the matter.
The Galileo case and the gradual triumph of experimental science was a serious blow to Aristotle. Before the late Middle Ages, scientific knowledge in general was just passed down and accepted on trust as the wisdom of antiquity. The whole Renaissance reflects this admiration for the knowledge of the past that was coming to light. Ancient works were spread in Europe as a result of better communications, trade, an increase in prosperity, and the growth of the educated middle class. Aristotle and Plato held a high position in the minds of many. However, among some intellectuals and philosophers, especially in England, there was a growing awareness that Aristotle contained scientific errors. Experimental science went beyond the wisdom that was handed down from the past. It tried to do experiments to give first hand knowledge. Galileo was part of this new trend.
It is in this context that we can understand Hume’s philosophy and his denial of substance as found in Aristotle. Another very important aspect of philosophy that we find in Hume and others of this time is the loss of the clear distinction between human imagination and human thought: for Hume, "thoughts" are faint images. This confusion continues even to our own time. Aristotle had carefully taken note of the sense data that we collect in our imagination (and see in our dreams). But he distinguished this from our capacity for abstract thought (our reasoning ability) which goes beyond sense data. This important distinction disappeared at this period in philosophy. An example is Bertrand Russell (d. 1970); he is a well known philosopher of our own era. In his description of how we get a "concept" of a table, it is clear that he has not distinguished between human imagination and human thought. This distinction is absolutely fundamental in philosophy, and anyone who ignores it is doomed from the start to failure.
This distinction goes back to the struggle between Protagoras and Socrates. Socrates had realized that there was some sort of moral standard by which human acts could be judged. This was clearly not a material standard bound up with those things that we can picture in our imagination. Socrates studied the kind of notions that we speak of when we discuss friendship, loyalty, justice, and other such "abstract" concepts. It is this kind of abstract knowledge that distinguishes humans from animals. Animals certainly have an imagination which they use in practical life, but it is not the power of abstract reasoning. Due to the present confusion about thought and imagination, it is not surprising to find people today that think of humans as just a more "intelligent" animal. In fact, humans have a particular kind of intelligence. This is why Aristotle defined them as a rational animals. Imagination is something that even animals have. Thus, for example, a dog can recognize a voice of a known person who is calling from the other side of the door. He has heard that voice many times before, but this is not abstract thought. When we speak of loyalty or justice, it is not tied to any image like a table or chair, it is something known but without an image. That is the kind of purely abstract thought that distinguishes people from animals.
Aristotle saw a human person as an animal with reasoning powers. People had senses like the animals, an imagination like the animals, but they also could reason in the abstract way that Socrates stressed. It is precisely at the period of empiricism that this important distinction is lost and writings use the word "thought" in a general way for truly human thought and the imagination common to both people and animals. This is why millions of dollars are spent here and there trying to teach animals to talk. It is evident, however, that if animals are exposed for long periods of time to humans and never learn to follow the conversations going on, they certainly are incapable of learning to talk in a truly human way. This is why children who naturally cannot speak due to some medical problem learn to understand speech in a completely normal way though they are incapable of answering. One must be able to understand before one can truly speak. Aristotle clearly realized that people have a unique quality that separates them from animals. All of this is related to the concept that there must be an adequate cause for a specific effect. This idea of cause and effect was a further refinement of the observation that "from nothing, nothing comes." Leibniz (d. 1716) phrased this idea in a more precise way: "Everything has a sufficient reason." It came to be known as the principle of sufficient reason.
We have now are in a position to move on to another important philosopher who resurrects in a dramatic way the concept of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things." This position and ones like it are called subjectivism by Pope John Paul II. The anthropocentric shift at the time of Descartes leads to this subjectivism, but there were other factors as well. The doubts raised about our ability to know the world around us were organized in a very systematic way by Kant (d. 1804). Aristotle had classified the world according to categories. Kant turned everything upside down by saying that actually it is people that organize sense knowledge by categories that originate in human ways of knowing.
He maintained that in fact we cannot have reliable knowledge about the objective world around us: he called the objective world the noumenon or "the thing in itself." What we know instead of the objective world is the knowledge of our senses (that the empiricists had spoken of). For him, sense knowledge merely provided the raw material for the human mind that systematizes this information by subjective categories. We have no way of knowing whether our sense knowledge of appearances (the phenomena) really tells us about the "thing in itself." Man is thus once again the "measure of all things." Up until the end of the Middle Ages, the dominant view had been that truth in the human mind consists in the correspondence of our ideas with the reality outside us. A discrepancy would indicate error in the mind. With Kant, the reality outside of us is really not known with the kind of certitude we find in the traditional philosophies of the Middle Ages. Even in contemporary thought, Pope John Paul II laments the fact that some scholars "tend to stop short at the question of how reality is understood and expressed without going further to see whether reason can discover its essence" (N. 84). Philosophy is then reduced to a kind of hermeneutics or simply a philosophy of language.
Since Kant had spread the idea that we do not truly know the world in which we live (the thing in itself), it was easy for another man like Hegel to come along and maintain that there is no "thing in itself." All is reduced to thought. One of the things that is also interesting about Hegel however is the dynamism that he attributes to this world of ideas. In our study of philosophy we have already seen in neo-Platonism a dynamism whereby the world arises from the One. In a descending order, the One, by emanation, causes the universe in which we live to appear. Hegel turns this system upside down. Instead of seeing emanation from a superior being running down the ladder of beings, Hegel sees a very simple progression of ideas that rises in greater and greater complexity. He believed that this was evident in the history of the world as it was understood by him at that time. Just as there is an element of necessity in the development of the Neo-Platonic world, Hegel saw this historical development as a kind of logical necessity as well.
To bring all this about, Hegel abandoned the logic of Aristotle. Aristotle had simply given systematic rules that logical people spontaneously use is their conversation whether or not they had actually studied logic. Aristotle had done a work that similar to the work done when someone writes the first grammar of a language. One finds the rules that govern speech in that language. This is what Aristotle did with logical discourse that reflects ordinary human common sense. But he did it in a very thorough way, even to the degree of showing how various kinds of concepts are used in human reason. Ockham had already denied of course that our concepts really reflect the world around us. For him, we simply invented words to label different but similar things. Aristotle, on the contrary, would say that each apple or flower, etc. has the "form" of a specific nature that the mind can understand. Thus, when we visit a new country, we see things which we have never seen before but we recognize them as belonging to the class of flowers and to have a corresponding "form" which is grasped by our mind in the concept of this or that new reality. We do not invent the categories, rather we discover the categories in which nature is already organized.
Kant had denied Aristotle’s objective approach to knowledge and replaced it with a subjective one. Now Hegel denied Aristotle’s approach to logic and proposed his own type of logic. Here again we can see how philosophy can become irrelevant to ordinary thought, especially scientific thought. Scientists discuss and reason about the world using the same approach as ordinary people. Thus, they use words like cause and substance and nature in a way that requires no special philosophical studies. Indeed many or most scientists have never even studied philosophy much less Kant or Hegel. Hegel’s logic therefore is quite odd and would have seemed doomed to the old curiosity shop except for an event that would completely change the picture of philosophy and the world. But first let us see this curious logic of Hegel.
For Aristotle, being and non-being (according to the principle of non contradiction) would remain permanently distinct and thus static unless something intervenes from outside. Hegel claimed that being and non-being spontaneously resolve into becoming. Neo-Platonism had seen in the world various "contradictions" such as light and darkness, hot and cold, etc. All these flow from the One: a coincidence of opposites. Hegel used the terms thesis and antithesis as the first opposites of a triad that resolves itself in a synthesis. However, rather than flowing from a superior One, they were evolving towards a One. Hegel had basically returned to the classical Greek problem of change in the world, and his logic was useful for him to show how historically things become different as new situations appear. His logic therefore is used in a very specific way to try to prove that history is in fact a "logical" flow of events and thus under some sort of law of logical necessity which makes it dynamic and constantly new. This theory also has the value for some people by replacing the traditional notion of a Christian Creator and caring (provident) God with the same sort of necessary dynamism we find in Neo-Platonism.
Hegel was hardly harmless inasmuch as he helped lay the respectable intellectual foundations for Hitler’s fascism. More damage came about in a more universal way from a development that assured Hegel an important place in history. This was the advent of Karl Marx (d. 1883). At the time of Kant, philosophy had become bogged down in an epistemological swamp – the question of truth and our ability to know it prevented thought from sanely moving forward. Such a philosophy is irrelevant to practical life. Whether reality is what it seems to be or not, everyone acts on the presuppositions of common sense in moving out of the way of a speeding bus or dousing a blaze with water. Karl Marx therefore proposed simply acting and then seeing the results of our actions! This hardly solved the problem of Kant in an intellectual way, but Marx felt that the whole debate was made irrelevant by what he regarded as incontestable deeds. He turned Hegel upside down by accepting the historical method of analysis according to thesis, antithesis and synthesis. However he asserted the doctrine of materialism rather than idealism.
Marx was far from irrelevant to real life. He was not just writing for the elite. He used his philosophical theories to justify a world revolution based on radical socialism. This gave rise to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Communist countries. It is Marxism that makes "Western Philosophy" clearly truly global, a world philosophy because it has penetrated areas where Christianity and Islam have had little or no influence historically. It has also brought philosophy down to the level of the common man. Here is a philosopher whose name is known even by the illiterate. As with Hegel, this new kind of dialectical (thesis and antithesis) reasoning had the same defects as Aristotelian science. Experimental science is based on observation, theory, and the testing of the theory by experiments. Aristotelian science did make use of observations and theory, but there was no real testing of the theories. The concrete example is that of a falling object. If I drop a fist size stone from a tall building and a large boulder, which will hit first? Most people would "logically" conclude that the heavier object would fall faster because it is heavier. This seems logical, but with advent of experimental science, the theory had to be tested. Galileo tried dropping two objects of different weights from the leaning tower of Pisa and found that conventional wisdom was wrong! In fact, both objects fall at the same time.
The problem with attempting the logical interpretation of history is that various interpretations are possible and it is really impossible to test what is already past. Though we may give explanations which we find probable and convincing, that doesn’t prove in a scientific way that our theories are true. Marx and his disciples were convinced by dialectical logic that the triumph of Communism in the world was a logical and therefore infallible truth. History has shown it to be otherwise. Moreover, Pope Leo XIII, using traditional logic had predicted in Rerum Novarum (1891) that socialism would not produce widespread prosperity; rather, he said that it would produce widespread poverty and oppressive interference of governments in the lives of the citizens. The facts of history later showed his analysis to be amazingly foresighted.
In fact, immediately prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conviction was widespread among intellectuals in many lands that Communism was indeed the way to prosperity and the wave of the future. History has proven that these genuinely brilliant minds were wrong. Human beings are not computers, they are also under the continual influence of their own subjective wishes and fears. It is only the truly wise man that can rise above this. In his encyclical Fides et Ratio, Pope John Paul II, made this relevant comment: "If human beings, with their intelligence fail to recognize God as the Creator of all, it is not because they lack the means to do so, but because their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment in the way" (N. 20). Although the Pope was speaking specifically about the demonstration of God’s existence, the same thing applies in human discernment on the daily decisions of ordinary life not to mention questions of philosophy.
Another problem with trying to analyze history is the fact that prejudices can influence the way the data is interpreted. Even in our own times it is still possible in many circles to hear that the Communists "saved" Europe from the Fascists. Historically, the Fascists appeared and grew in strength by their promise to save the world from Communism. It was Communism that produced a Fascist reaction! Both Hitler and Mussolini began as socialists in a struggle with the Communist socialists. Even more importantly, the Second World War took place precisely because the Communists of the Soviet Union agreed to divide Poland with the National Socialists of Germany before Hitler dared to plunge Germany into war.
In short, a really scientific interpretation of history is not possible to do in the same way that experimental science is done. People are much too attached to their prejudices. Nevertheless, after the victory of the Maoist Marxists in Nepal in 2008, the leader spoke of Marxism as being a "science." This aura of science and practicality and the hope of some sort of justice for the poor have saved Marxism from the dustbin of history. Far from being irrelevant, it is seen as highly relevant to many who have despaired of any other solution to the injustices in the world. However, it must be added that convictions that arise from desperation can easily be wishful thinking rather than truly logical conclusions.
The Church and St. Thomas Aquinas
Up until this point, the problem of intellectual truth was a major and almost sole concern of many philosophers. The prevailing uncertainty prepared the way for a pragmatic step. A way to avoid this problem is to simply concentrate on our inner experience of phenomena (that which is apparent to our daily life) without entering into debates about what might lay beyond it. This philosophy is exemplified by Husserl (d. 1938) who proposed phenomenology as a way forward for a philosophy that was truly relevant to life. He wanted to avoid the approach of Kant which inevitably leads to skepticism. It should be pointed out that many kinds of theology had always been very much concerned with everyday life as a human experience. However, these writers with their blend of the human and divine were not studied under their purely philosophical aspects. Philosophy that wanted to study the human condition therefore was often left to those who had no faith or who excluded faith from their discussions. Nevertheless, if these writers were faithful in their efforts to study the facts of the human condition, their observations still had a genuine value for theology and any true philosophy.
It would be true to say that phenomenology was a healthy return to the past. Most evidently, this is seen in its concentration on the human situation rather than abstract epistemology. This return obviously was very much in harmony with Socrates which had lead to Plato and Aristotle’s pioneering work. It was also a return to the past in the sense that Husserl was in fact a student of the philosopher Brentano (d. 1917), who had been schooled in Thomistic and Aristotelian philosophy. The link with the past was especially the concept of intentionality found in Husserl that ran like a thread through these philosophers. Intentionality referred to the fact that humans focus on some object or situation of their experience. This link with Thomistic thought was through the first stirrings of neo-Thomistic thought in Germany that was resurrecting the study of Aristotle as well. It is not so surprising, therefore that one of Husserl’s students, Edith Stein, later converted to Catholicism and wrote philosophical works on St. Thomas. (She died as martyr under Hitler and is a canonized saint.)
Pope Leo XIII, who had so perceptively foreseen the catastrophic effects of Communism, also saw the damage that arose when a solid philosophical base was lacking in the Catholic world. As various currents of philosophy appeared on the intellectual horizon, there were inevitably attempts to express Catholic truth in the light of these new theories. The consequences easily lead to a distortion or betrayal of Catholic truth. The philosophy of St. Thomas had proven its value in synthesizing in a logical way various philosophical doctrines of the past. It would be wrong to think that the Church can just "baptize" any current of thought. A philosophy has to demonstrate that it can stand on its own two feet as valid before there can be any hope of wedding faith and reason in a credible synthesis.
The Pope proposed St. Thomas as someone who had succeeded in this task. In his encyclical Aeterni Patris in 1879, Pope Leo therefore asked that St. Thomas be promoted in institutions of higher learning to give theology a solid basis for progress. This lead to the spread of neo-Thomistic philosophy; it was especially, though not exclusively, a Catholic movement. It was an effort to build on the accomplishments of St. Thomas just as he had built on his predecessors. Pope John Paul II pointed out in Fides et Ratio that it was precisely this Thomistic formation that led to much of the thinking that made the Second Vatican Council so successful in expressing Catholic truth in the modern world (N. 58).
Nevertheless, Pope John Paul II makes it clear that the Catholic Church "has no philosophy of her own nor does she canonize any one particular philosophy in preference to others" (N. 49). It is clear that there have been philosophers who were saints and high ecclesiastics over the years who were not simply disciples of St. Thomas. On the other hand, it is also true that "It is the task of the Magisterium in the first place to indicate which philosophical presuppositions and conclusions are incompatible with revealed truth …." (N. 50). For this reason, in the past the Church has condemned fideism and radical traditionalism because of their refusal to recognize the genuine power of human reason in its search for the truth. On the other hand, rationalism and ontologism are also rejected for giving reason powers that can only come from the light of faith (N. 52).These are the two extremes which St. Thomas avoided in his synthesis.
The Pope makes it clear that St. Thomas still has an important role to play for Catholic students of philosophy. In the Code of Canon Law, which was published in 1983, the Code refers (Can. 251) to a text approved by the Second Vatican Council in l965. It is N. 15 of the document Optatam Totius. There it was stated that philosophical studies in the seminaries should be based on the "Perennial Philosophy." Later the Congregation of Seminaries and Universities clarified that the expression "Perennial Philosophy" referred to the principles of St. Thomas.
The Pope clarifies the significance of the thought of St. Thomas further with this important paragraph:
"It should be clear in the light of these reflections why the Magisterium has repeatedly acclaimed the merits of Saint Thomas’ thought and made him the guide and model for theological studies. This has not been in order to take a position on properly philosophical questions nor to demand adherence to particular theses. The Magisterium’s intention has always been to show how Saint Thomas is an authentic model for all who seek the truth. In his thinking, the demands of reason and the power of faith found the most elevated synthesis ever attained by human thought, for he could defend the radical newness introduced by Revelation without ever demeaning the venture proper to reason" (N. 78).
The position of the Pope is carefully nuanced. On the one hand, the Church wants St. Thomas to be studied as an important and unique example of Catholic philosophy and theology. On the other hand, the Church does not want to imply that since that time there is no further need for reflection and thought on these matters. There will always be the possibility of further progress with the passage of time, and various perspectives will emerge as history moves forward. It is in the light of this position that one should understand the remarks Pope John Paul II makes about the teaching of the doctrines of St. Thomas in Catholic faculties of philosophy. He makes it clear that a superficial glance at Thomism is not at all what the Church has in mind: "If it has been necessary from time to time to intervene on this question, to reiterate the value of the Angelic Doctor’s insights and insist on the study of his thought, that has been because the Magisterium's directives had not always been followed with the readiness one would wish (N. 61).
In Fides et Ratio, the Pope quotes the document Dei Filius of Vatican I to sum up the Church’s stance on the relation of faith to reason, "Even if faith is superior to reason, there can never be a true divergence between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals the mysteries and bestows the gift of faith has also placed in the human spirit the light of reason. Thus God could not deny himself, nor could the truth ever contradict the truth" (N. 53). It is in this context that we can understand Pope John Paul’s criticism that "after the Second Vatican Council, many Catholic faculties were in some ways impoverished by a diminished sense of the importance of the study not just of Scholastic philosophy but more generally of the study of philosophy itself. I cannot fail to note with surprise and displeasure that this lack of interest in the study of philosophy is shared by not a few theologians" (N. 61). As a conclusion to this, the Pope rather forcefully states: "I wish to repeat clearly that the study of philosophy is fundamental and indispensable to the structure of theological studies and to the formation of candidates for the priesthood" (N. 62).
The relationship of reason and faith is illustrated in the Pope’s comments on fundamental theology. He states that it "should show how, in the light of the knowledge conferred by faith, there emerge certain truths which reason, from its own independent enquiry already perceives. Revelation endows these truths with their fullest meaning (N. 67). In a broader vision, he states that "Speculative dogmatic theology thus presupposes and implies a philosophy of the human being, the world and, more radically, of being, which has objective truth as its foundation" (N. 66). Implicit in this stress on the role of philosophy is the important role of language. The Pope cites (in footnote 112) a statement of Pope Pius XII in his encyclical Humani Generis (1950). There he states that, "those notions and terms which have been developed through common effort by Catholic teachers over the course of the centuries to bring about some understanding of dogma are certainly not based an any … weak foundation. They are based on principles and notions deduced from a true knowledge of created things … some of these notions have not only been employed by the Ecumenical Councils, but even sanctioned by them so it is wrong to depart from them."
Returning to the role of philosophy at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, there is another important change of focus. The role of the will was very much in the background during the debates that had raged in Europe about the philosophy of knowledge (epistemology). With the philosopher Nietzsche (d. 1849), all was to change. He spoke of the "will to power" and of the "superman" (the superior kind of person who rises in power and influence and imposes himself on others). Needless to say, German philosophy also had its influence in preparing the path of philosophical respectability in Germany for Nazi propaganda and thinking that might otherwise have appeared to be merely manic ranting.
The destruction of traditional Christian thinking in European culture necessarily called for more than a merely intellectual approach. That could only be accomplished by practical measures that went well beyond questions on the ultimate nature of reality (metaphysics) and epistemology. In his book, Crossing the Threshold of Hope, Pope John Paul II devotes a brief chapter to the question of Salvation History; there he states that within a century of the death of Descartes, a new movement, called "the Enlightenment" took political shape in the French Revolution. Far from their using rational arguments, the Pope notes the violence that they used to try to destroy the Church. This led to the closing of many convents, school, monasteries and churches.
It happened first in France and later elsewhere in Europe through Napoleon’s victories. Religious and laity both suffered persecution and death. The church was impoverished and crippled by the confiscation of property. The slogan of course was "liberty, equality, fraternity." In this context, Pope John Paul II speaks of how Christian values were cut off from their roots in the Gospel. These values in fact were hardly new to Christianity as could amply be demonstrated. The Pope pointed this out when he said, "The notion of the person as a spiritual being is another of faith’s specific contributions: the Christian proclamation of human dignity, equality and freedom has undoubtedly influenced modern philosophical thought" (N. 76). The Pope added elsewhere that "In dismantling barriers of race, social status, and gender, Christianity proclaimed from the first the equality of all men and women before God" (N 38).
In fact, slightly before the French Revolution (1789) a nationalist revolution had taken place in the United States of America (1776) with the very similar goals of freedom for all. However, the American Revolution was in no way hostile to religion nor was there propaganda against religion. Quite the contrary, human rights were seen as coming from God along the lines of traditional natural law rather than as a gift of any human authority. It was already mentioned above how history cannot be studied "scientifically" the way we might study the laws of physics. Our personal prejudices, etc. enter into our considerations. In fact, the American Revolution in no way contributed to the cause of those who wanted to overturn traditional Christianity, and so the French Revolution emerged as the "model" revolution for those who were against the Church and not simply for genuine freedom.
As anti-Christian forces grew increasingly powerful, Europe’s governments established control over universities and schools which had formerly been run by the Church. In the study of history thereafter, the French Revolution was increasingly glorified, and its excesses (the bloodshed, wars, and oppression) regarded as being rather minor almost necessary evils. The American Revolution (which was not anti-Christian) was often relegated to a footnote with no consideration of the alternative it offered to the excesses of the French Revolution. When Pope Benedict XVI visited the United States of America in 2008, he presented the American solution as an example that secularism does not have to be anti-religious as it often is in present day Europe.
We have seen how philosophy gave birth to two great competing systems involved in the Second World War: the communists and the other Allies on one side, the Fascists on the other. Europe was left impoverished and in ruins. It was in this new situation that another philosophy of note appeared. It was called existentialism. Oddly it was not at all concerned with existence, at least not in the sense that we saw in Alfarabi and St. Thomas. Existentialism was really concerned with the area that had been rather neglected in philosophy due to the preoccupation with epistemology. Existentialism instead focused on personal free will which had been brought to the fore by Nietzsche so forcefully. This new development has to be explained. As long as most people believed in Christianity or at least were under the influence of Christian tradition, the average person struggled to do good and avoid evil as his parents had taught him. Of course, even during the time of the Renaissance, the pagan philosophers had provided alternative ethical systems such as that of the Stoics or Epicurus (d. 270 BC), but this reached only a tiny minority in the population.
The role of the Church had been seriously, if not totally, wounded in the period after the French Revolution. Over the following centuries, this situation created an ethical void that had to be filled by secular thinkers. This was the terrain of the existentialists. The terrain was also vast because the new economic conditions in Europe had created a large number of people who were highly educated in a secular and often anti-Christian way. The Second World War and its aftermath had also created a situation in which the old rules no longer were seen as adequate or binding. There is an idea accredited to Burke (d. 1797): For evil to triumph, the good need only do nothing. Many felt that evil had almost triumphed in the early twentieth century precisely for that reason. Simple conformity to the traditional norms was rejected. Bold action was needed. However, one might add, that even when the good take action or speak out, they can always be ignored, which results in the same negative effect. The classic example of this is Pope Pius XI’s encyclicals against both the Italian Fascists in the German National Socialists (Nazis). His warnings and admonitions were mostly ignored and forgotten.
The root of this rejection of Christian faith and the Christian philosophy that accompanies it is the same as the rejection of God himself, who is the truth. Pope John Paul writes in Fides et Ratio: "If human beings with their intelligence fail to recognized God as Creator of all, it is not because they lack the means to do so, but because their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment on the way" (N. 19). Commenting on the sin of Adam and Eve in Genesis the Pope adds that, "From that time onwards, the human capacity to know the truth was impaired by an aversion to the one who is the source and origin of truth … human reasoning became distorted and inclined to falsehood" (N. 22). In the light of the Pope’s analysis, we can understand an aversion to the truth in contemporary intellectual establishment in the West and a tendency to isolate Christian thinking in a kind of intellectual ghetto where it is simply ignored or held in contempt as were the Pope’s warnings about Fascism before World War II.
This tendency to simply ignore the Church is widespread and really not too subtle. All too often, there appears to be no real desire for dialogue with Christian thought. As I mentioned earlier, Hegel’s disciples had published a history of philosophy based on Hegel’s notes. The thick book devoted less than a page to the thought of St. Thomas. Similarly, a very popular history of philosophy in the United States over this past century is a work of Will Durant. He first published The Story of Philosophy in 1926, and there have been numerous reprints. He skips from Aristotle to Francis Bacon (d. 1626). Everything in between is left out! As just one of many other examples, there is the Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy. It describes itself in this way: "In-Depth Explanations and Examples Covering over 3,000 Entries." However it makes no mention of famous Twentieth Catholic philosophers of Neo-Thomistic school of philosophy like Gilson (d. 1978) and Maritain (d. 1973) as well as other Neo-Thomists.
About one in every seven persons of the world’s population is Roman Catholic, and a very significant percentage of literate and often highly educated people on the planet are Catholic. How can one current of predominantly Catholic thought such as neo-Thomism be so ignored? As we have seen, the Pope gives the root cause of this closed attitude to the Church as the sin of Genesis: "human reasoning became distorted and inclined to falsehood" (N. 22). Elsewhere he added, "People can even run from the truth as soon as they glimpse it because the are afraid of its demands" (N. 28) This strong tendency to ignore Catholic thought (rather than to engage in dialogue) is quite the opposite of the Catholic approach already in the time of the Fathers of the early Church. It was their attention to attacks and criticisms of Christianity which obliged them to answer in the philosophical categories that their adversaries understood. The classic method of Medieval thought is illustrated well by St. Thomas who habitually listed the opinions of his opponents and then responded to their arguments point by point.
A new use of the word "existence" is found in the recent school of philosophy called existentialism. The fact that the traditional meaning could so easily be discarded is a sign of how very much philosophy had lost sight of the importance of existence as it is used in common speech: e.g. the mammoths no longer exist. The common sense meaning disappeared, and a new meaning took its place. The new meaning has its roots in the early days of European idealism. We have already seen how in England there was a skeptical attitude about the human ability to really know reality as it truly is even as early as Ockham. This skepticism continued with the empiricists. For the first time, George Berkeley (d. 1753) a new meaning for existence appeared and was proposed in a philosophy of early idealism. He used the phrase "esse est percipi" which means that the things we describe as "existing" are nothing other than our sense impressions. In more precise words, he believed that our imagination receives data that really does not come from the material world.
Empiricism of Hume actually shared the basis for such a philosophy by saying that it was only our sense impressions that we actually knew, not the substance that common sense (and Aristotle) saw as the constant basis for any object of our senses. At this point in human history, it was easy for Berkeley to propose God as the source of our sense perceptions. In other words, we do not discover the world by our senses, it is God who creates a world for us by providing us with sense impressions. This form of idealism, which relied on God, would not be as popular as later forms of idealism such as Hegel’s, but the phrase "esse est percipi" (being is perception) came to be regarded as a self-evident truth by many. This expression is completely subjective and is one of the aspects of modern philosophy that Pope John Paul criticized because it turns us away from the real existence which is a manifestation of God, the I AM at the basis of all transitory beings.
This idealistic mentality formed the philosophical background for the word existence in existentialism, however, this does not mean that existentialists were idealists or that they can all be lumped together in their philosophy of knowledge. What they did share was a stress on the problem of making decisions in our modern world and reflecting on how a people are transformed by their decisions as they live their lives. There are clearly ideas in any careful analysis of human decisions that can be quite valid for theological analysis, and theology had dealt with problems of moral confusion, temptation, and discernment in the past also. However, the problem for Christian philosophy is that as soon as Christian elements are brought into consideration, quite a few people in today’s world simply regard such writing as "religion," and therefore it is hard for writings of this explicitly Christian content to be accepted as having philosophical value. This gives atheists and agnostics a kind of monopoly in the philosophical area of discussing important problems like death, suicide, fidelity to duty, etc. Catholic thought thus is easily rejected by a secular mentality that insists in talking as if God did not exist. Such a vision is of course completely inadequate for dealing with real life situations.
In the chapter called "What has become of the ‘History of Salvation’" in his book Crossing the Threshold of Hope, Pope John Paul II deplored the fact that Christian ethical tradition on the dignity of man had been torn away from its Christian roots. This issue came to the fore when the European Community was trying to write a kind of fundamental law or constitution. There was an unwillingness to admit officially that Christianity had had any role at all in the development of European civilization.
This is quite striking since in America it has been quite traditional to speak of their "Judeo-Christian" cultural tradition (that certainly came from Europe!). The proposed European basic law had created the problem by recognizing its roots in Greece and Rome and then ignoring the role of Christianity. Thus it was logical to complete the description, but there was ferocious and uncompromising refusal to refer at all to the role that Christianity had played. The Catholic Church objected on a number of occasions about this attempt to falsify history, but in the end the whole project to had to be abandoned for other reasons, and a less controversial basic law was proposed in its place.
In the same chapter, Pope John Paul had also lamented the fact that God had been removed from any philosophical role in real life. We have already seen how St. Thomas had followed the logic of "from nothing comes nothing" and reached the conclusion that whatever change takes place, whatever new thing comes into existence, it is always the God of existence who was acting as first cause as the "prime mover" and conserver of all things. This meant that even any change such as a movement of the hand or a thought in our mind ultimately obtains its reality from the God of existence, the I AM who revealed himself to Moses.
The alternative was the God of the deists. He is recognized as creating somehow the world at its origin, but then he is imagined as remaining apart from it. This idea would seem to owe its remote origin to the Aristotelian notion of a distant God who is not directly involved in human affairs. Aristotle never actually realized the role that God had in providing existence to each and every reality that appears. It was St. Thomas who clarified this. That is why the Pope emphasized in his book Crossing the Threshold of Hope that human thought must recognize the God of existence and stop recognizing only a God who is "outside the world" (the deist notion) and therefore irrelevant to human lives and human history.
It is in this context that we can see that when the Pope speaks of existence in the age-old tradition of philosophy, he is not speaking in the same sense as an idealist like Berkeley who claimed that "being is (only) perception." This way of approaching the matter is precisely what the Pope was objecting to when he spoke of the "subjectivism and immanentism" present in contemporary philosophy. It is true that Berkeley claimed that the perceptions came from God, but later idealism eliminated this view and took the anthropocentric view, leaving God "outside of the world" if they even they recognized God at all. It is in this subjective way of thinking that we can understand the statement "God is dead" of Nietzsche. God had become irrelevant to his view of reality. There was no question here of the objective existence or non-existence of God as in the language of St. Thomas. Nietzsche spoke from the viewpoint of a humanity who creates its own subjective "reality."
Existentialism therefore is not really speaking of Thomistic existence or non-existence when it speaks of "existence." Nor is it speaking in the common sense language of one who says that the Roman Empire no longer exists. It is speaking rather of the human beings who transform themselves by free and often painful choices; it is speaking basically of freedom and its consequences. Just as phenomenology had tried to avoid the problem of metaphysics (the fundamental nature of reality) in the post-Kantian period of philosophy, existentialists stressed freedom rather than questions of metaphysical being. For those like Sartre, who was an atheist, this meant a whole subjectivist approach on how to exercise personal freedom.
Without a guide from religion and God, the exercise of freedom becomes even more complicated because it is not simply a decision to accept or not the law in a given situation. For someone like Sartre (d. 1980) there is no objective law of behavior that demands our conformity, and therefore he spoke of the human as "condemned" to freedom. The Pope’s insistence on the need to overcome the immanentism and subjectivism of our present age has to be understood in this context. It is clear, therefore, that existentialism can have valuable insights into the struggles that face humanity in the exercise of freedom, but existentialism does not provide a complete view of the world and cannot fulfill the complementary role of faith seeking understanding.